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20 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (INTELLIGENCE)

SUBJECT: Status of IAC Estimate of Soviet Reaction to NSC 143

25X1A9a 1. This memorandum is in amplification of the discussion held by [redacted] of my staff with members of the Office of National Estimates on 17 March 1953 with regard to the above subject.

2. The following are replies to the questions which you have raised:

Question

a. Does the Committee desire an estimate only as to "official" Soviet reaction; i.e., of the regimes in control of the Iron Curtain countries or does it also want the reaction of Communist parties in Western Europe.

Reply

The Committee is concerned with all Communist reaction that would furnish clues as to the type, scope and intensity of probable action that the Communists and/or the Soviets might take in frustrating the plan outlined in NSC 143.

Question

b. Does the Committee wish to ascertain the reaction of individuals behind the Iron Curtain who would be potential escapees?

Reply

No.

Question

c. Does the Committee want the estimate to include possible Soviet reactions and propaganda exploitation in the event the VFC program were to prove a "flop"?

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Reply

Yes.

Question

d. The number of enrollees in the VFC in the initial phases of organizations?

Reply

A VFC of about 32,000 enrollees is envisaged at the present time.

Question

e. What nationalities to be included and whether to be formed into national units?

Reply

Although the nationalities to be included are not yet decided, it is fairly certain that all nationalities in the category of satellites are to be included with the possible exception of East Germany. The units to be established would be formed into national battalions.

Question

f. What would be the nature of the propaganda for launching the VFC?

Reply

This program is not yet completely decided upon by the PSB but, in general, it will follow intensified current themes plus an improved inducement program, probably promising U.S. citizenship at the end of a specified term of enlistment.

Question

g. Proposed nature of the employment of the units of the VFC, in particular as to whether they would be "earmarked" to go into the countries of their national origin and/or be used anywhere outside their own countries?

Reply

Because the VFC units will be organized of nationals from behind the Iron Curtain, it is unlikely that these organizations would go into countries of their national origin unless a global war were to ensue. Probable employment will be in Europe with later consideration to be given to movement to Korea, depending upon the success of the campaign.

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I hope that

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3. I hope that these replies will assist you in arriving at the necessary assumptions that must be made on your part. It is intended that this information will be used as guide-lines rather than as specific assumptions spelled out to the point where the value of the estimate might be reduced. In general, what is sought is the estimate of the intelligence community of the Communist and/or Soviet reaction to the proposition outlined in NSC 143, particularly as to whether they will step up the pace of the cold war in the face of what might be considered by them as provocative.

4. I hope that it is possible for you to produce this estimate within the next week. I am sure that you appreciate that the Committee cannot go ahead with its drafts for action on a firm basis unless we are informed as to whether or not there will be serious Communist and/or Soviet reaction at this very critical stage in our relations with the Soviet Union.



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CIA Representative
NSC 143 Ad Hoc Committee